Description
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China’s infrastructure diplomacy in developing regions has generated growing interest. Most studies, however, focus on China’s geopolitical and economic goals and therefore overlook the agency of recipient countries. Addressing this gap, this paper presents a framework to analyze the way in which Latin American countries shape Chinese infrastructure projects in the region. To do so, it draws from two qualitative case studies, Argentina and Ecuador, based on interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary sources. The framework (inspired by Putnam’s two-level game) is based on three key elements 1) leaders’ ideas about development, 2) the strength of domestic businesses and institutions and 3) the country’s needs for financing and technology. It argues that the characteristics of Chinese projects (location, scale, role of domestic labor and corporations, financing conditions) are not an imposition from Beijing, but the result of complex interactions between Latin American actors and Chinese corporations, bans and government entities. This paper shows that the implications of China’s infrastructure diplomacy cannot be studied in a vacuum, but must be rooted in the institutional, ideational and socioeconomic structures of recipient countries.
