Description
One of the most prevalent contentions regarding the Arab Spring is that it encouraged many Middle Eastern states to disregard the non-interference norm in favor of a more active role in other states’ affairs. While there was certainly an extensive increase in the volume of non-military involvement in some of the post-Arab Spring regional conflicts, most of them stopped short of becoming military interventions during the first half of the decade. However, during the second half of the decade, military interventions in regional conflicts became much more prevalent, and those interventions became more extensive and prolonged.
This paper argues that developments that took place in the Middle East in the years following the Arab Spring threatened some of the regional states’ ontological security, thus increasing the number of military interventions in the region’s conflicts. Specifically, while many regard the Sunni-Shiite conflict, and especially the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as the main driver of these interventions, I argue that the rise of another power within the Sunni camp threatened the would-be leaders of this camp, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, identities, thus driving them to intensify their military involvements in regional conflicts during the second half of this decade.
