Description
William Zartman’s ‘ripeness’ theory says that parties to a violent conflict will not negotiate sincerely in the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). In such circumstances, Zartman recommends a mediator employ coercion by escalating the conflict into a MHS, but the concept is not fully elaborated. Building on Zartman, this paper specifies a new theory of ‘muscular mediation’, defined as a powerful mediator using coercion to achieve a mutual compromise that it formulates. The theory is evaluated in three cases from the 1990s: Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. The paper finds that muscular mediation can work but also may backfire by magnifying violence against civilians, especially when all of three adverse conditions are present: (1) the coerced agreement threatens a vital interest of a party; (2) that party has the potential to escalate violence against the opposing side’s civilians; (3) the muscular mediator does not deploy sufficient military forces to deter or prevent such escalation. The paper also explores why muscular mediation has been pursued under such adverse conditions. It concludes with advice for prospective muscular mediators.
