Description
This paper aims at identifying the key pillars of the Russian approach to strategy and war-fighting. In particular, I ask: what are the reasons that lead Russia to intervene militarily? And what are the main features of Russia’s military modus operandi? In order to answer these questions, I analyse and compare Russian strategies and operations in Ukraine and Syria. I do so by building on a wealth of original Russian sources, including articles published on professional military journals; as well as on a selected number of academic works and independent reports. I will show that, notwithstanding differences due to theatre-specific requirements, Russia has displayed similar patterns of military-strategic thinking and operational conduct across the Ukraine and Syria cases. I explain this by pointing to the existence of a Russian strategic culture, anchored to a rather static national image. My conclusions will be relevant to both academic debate and security praxis, as I will expand on the topic of continuity and change in Russian defence policy, and what we should expect from Russia in case of conflict.
