Description
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community’s record on war-to-peace transitions has been mixed. This article asks why externally-led statebuilding interventions for the past three decades have largely failed to achieve their intended impact. We argue that in fragile and conflict-affected states, local populations and external actors (especially from the West) have fundamentally different approaches to how states (ought to?) function. Each rule set is internally consistent to the world that conceived it, but viewed side-by-side, there is a yawning gap in how power and violence are deployed and constrained. Where the international community sees the potential for a “Good State” to develop if institutional reforms are made, citizens see a personalized state trapped in a corruption equilibrium. Where the international community prioritizes strengthening state security via its military and police, local communities evaluate which armed groups will inflict the least amount of harm on their families. Where the international community views the law as impartial and fixed, local populations know that it is relative and malleable.
