Description
Like asteroids, hundred-year floods and pandemic disease, thermonuclear war is a low-frequency, high-impact threat. If nothing is done, catastrophe is all but inevitable in the long run—yet each successive government and generation may fail to address it. Drawing on risk perception research, this paper argues that the nature of the threat of nuclear war causes it to receive less attention than it deserves. Nuclear deterrence is, moreover, what Stephen Gardiner calls a ‘front-loaded good’: its benefits accrue disproportionately to proximate generations, whereas much of the expected cost will be borne in the distant future. Recent surveys indicate that the US and Russian publics assign a surprisingly high likelihood to nuclear war. Nevertheless, earlier US and British research suggests that it is probably not believed to be just around the corner. This, together with the absence of easy solutions, encourages governments and publics to give priority to more pressing concerns. The danger is that the pattern will continue clear up to the point that nuclear war arrives.
