Description
Though NATO portends to remain a nuclear alliance so long as nuclear weapons exist, differing attitudes towards the usefulness of these specific capabilities exist among member states (see for example Yost 2009; Rapnouil/Varma & Witney 2018). Corroborating this seeming friction is the potential adaptation of a ‘sole purpose policy’ (SPP) by the US. President Biden declared his administration’s intent to rely less on nuclear weapons.
Even though some scholars point out that a SPP must not be equated with a no first use policy, research shows that the adaptation of the latter could potentially increase the credibility of the US’ nuclear deterrent (see for example Wolfsthal/Fetter 2018; Narang/Panda 2021). While the concept of deterrence is aimed at an adversary, the flipside – assurance – is aimed inwards, i.e., one’s allies.
This paper aims to explore what effect a US adaptation of a ‘sole purpose policy’ could have on the credibility of its nuclear assurance guarantees towards European allies. Based on Glenn H. Snyder’s alliance security dilemma model (1997) and elements of neoclassical realism (see Lobell/Ripsman/Taliaferro 2016), the impact of a SPP will be examined in light of NATO’s threat assessment by ways of analyzing relevant strategic documents.
