Description
Under the September 2021 AUKUS pact, the UK and US have pledged to sell Australia eight nuclear-powered attack submarines. Until now, no country without nuclear weapons has ever acquired a nuclear-powered submarine. Moreover, the nuclear submarines built by both the UK and US are fueled with nuclear weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU). If the UK and/or US were to sell such submarines, each one would require export of approximately one half-tonne of HEU, sufficient for at least 20 nuclear weapons. This would also set a precedent that could spur demands by other countries for HEU-fueled submarines. Resulting proliferation risks could be substantial, especially because IAEA safeguards agreements permit countries to avoid international inspections, for as long as decades, on nuclear materials declared for naval propulsion. A less dangerous alternative would be to sell Australia submarines fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is unsuitable for nuclear weapons. France and China already fuel their submarines with LEU, and the United States has had a program since 2016 to develop LEU Navy fuel that could last for the life of a submarine. This paper explores options for implementing AUKUS in ways that minimize risks of fostering nuclear proliferation.
