Description
Nuclear deterrence theory states that the relationship between two or more nuclear armed states yields stability and security, at least on the condition that the political leadership acts rationally, that vital interests are at stake, and that the deterrent is perceived as credible both with respect to capabilities and intentions. Nuclear deterrence advocates believe that the presence of nuclear weapons is an important explanation for (strategic) stability, security and peace among big powers since 1945. Nuclear deterrence critics state that the relationship cannot be proved, and that there are at least other explanatory variables for stability, security and peace. This paper aims to bring the phenomena of the so-called new weapon systems (drones, autonomous weapon systems, AI, hypersonic missiles, cyber, space) into this debate. What aspects related to the above-mentioned new weapon systems (or which of these weapon systems in general) either strengthen or undermine the strategic stability that supposedly results from the nuclear deterrence relationship between big powers? In other words, will these new weapon system strengthen or weaken strategic stability in a nuclear weapons world ?
