Description
The link between money and power in international organizations (IOs) is undisputed but elusive. While IOs are designed for longevity and resilience, they have seen dramatic shifts from assessed contributions to new actors and modalities. This article is particularly interested in the effects on the secretariat of IOs. It asks: Why and how does the diversification of resource mobilization affect an IO secretariat’s agency? The theoretical framework to address this question conceives of diversified resource mobilization as a principal-agent phenomenon at two levels of analysis. The group-level captures the effects of the number of principals and the collective complexity of their contract design.The dyadic level unpacks the effects of specific funders on the agenda and capacity of the secretariat. Empirically, the paper offers a rich plausibility probe through the case of the African Union. Based on elite interviews (N=130), participant observation and document analysis, the case study demonstrates how the AU Commission is resilient against attempts to influence its agenda and bureaucratic capacity. The AU, however, is also the victim of its success with diversification, as numerous small partnerships lead to agency-diminishing effects.
