Description
Since 2009, factions of the Boko Haram insurgency have attempted to oust the Nigerian government by force and establish in the North-East a strict Islamist system of governance. Its evolution from a group initially composed of “a few ragtag combatants” to an increasingly violent decade old insurgency has attracted the attention of the international community, various actors providing security force assistance.
Although the literature has noted foreign actors’ more modest means (compared to previous extensive deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan) to contribute to international security “elsewhere”, little research has explicitly investigated current British defence engagement in a former colonial territory.
This paper addresses this lacuna by firstly mapping British foreign policy and strategic rationale in a more crowded operating environment characterised by “persistent competition”. Secondly, it focuses on the challenges the UK faces in supporting Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign, namely on the impact a post-colonial setting has on power relations, perceptions, delivery and assimilation of training. It ultimately argues that a shared history both hinders and facilitates effective cooperation.
This qualitative research paper contributes with theoretical and empirical knowledge on post-colonial principal-agent dynamics in capacity building and military cooperation delivered to counter violent extremist organisations.
