Description
Why do some countries escape the political “resource curse” while others do not? The vast majority of scholarship argues that avoiding the anti-democratic effects of natural resources, in particular oil, largely depends on the quality of institutions, both past and present. Drawing on the most-likely case of Timor-Leste, one of the world’s most oil-dependent countries but which has successfully developed into a consolidated democracy, we challenge dominant institutionalist theories. We show that Timor-Leste did not escape the curse because of good pre-existing political institutions, the creation of good natural resource governance institutions, or otherwise favorable structural conditions for the advent of democracy. Instead, we find that the ideological beliefs of the independence movement, the structure of political competition, as well as the approaches of external actors have resulted in a political commitment to democracy despite difficult structural conditions and strong incentives for the development of authoritarian governance. This argument highlights the importance of ideology, agency at critical historical junctures, and constructive international engagement.
