Description
In the 1950s, China’s interpretations of and reactions to the US’s Taiwan policies and involvement led to substantial impacts on Sino-US relations and regional instability. This paper revisits the history of China-US confrontation in East Asia using the conceptual framework of emotions and affect. Specifically, the paper looks into how Chinese leaders interpret and emotionally react to the involvement of the US in Taiwan since the 1950s. Although existing studies have applied rational choice approaches or cognitivist perspectives to understand China’s responses to US policies, few have examined the roles of emotions in leadership and decision-making. Therefore, investigating the cases via the lens of emotions and affect helps provide alternative perspectives to existing issues in Taiwan, thus suggesting that misreading others’ emotions may result in misperceptions, miscalculations, and reactions that could destabilize regional security. Particularly, the paper analyses four confrontation cases, including 1) China’s reactions to Truman’s pronouncement in January 1950, 2) the Neutralization Policy in June 1950, 3) Eisenhower’s Policy in February 1953, and 4) the Mutual Defense treaty in 1954-55. As the US-China rivalry continues to haunt the region until very recently, the paper attempts to comprehend potential crises or conflicts in the Taiwan Strait that remain relevant to current politics.
