Description
One of the earliest resolutions at the UNSC (resolution 47, April 1948) was on the Kashmir conflict, calling for military de-escalation and subsequent organisation of a “plebiscite administration” in Indian and Pakistani Administered Kashmir. However, there are several inconsistencies in the UN’s understanding of the Kashmir conflict which has led to a legacy of failure in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Kashmir.
On a theoretical level, the prime inconsistency is the perspective that the conflict is solely an interstate one between India-Pakistan (and now China) rather than a conflict of self-determination that exists within the state boundaries of three post-colonial nation-states. The paper claims that, this lens emerged from the setting of hierarchies/distinction between legitimate and illegitimate owners of decolonisation movements-where India and Pakistan are legitimate, but Kashmir (as an independent entity) was considered illegitimate. This theoretical distinction within the UN has led to the formation of states in postcolonial global south where movements of self-determination are constantly delegitimised of which Kashmir is an example. In the first section, this theoretical approach will be critically analysed.
The UN’s statist approach to the Kashmiri conflict subsequently led to state centric peacebuilding and mediation efforts which are critically analysed in the second section of this paper. The UN military observer force, which was placed in Kashmir (in India and Pakistan) in 1949 has been unsuccessful in preventing the subsequent border conflicts between India and Pakistan (1965,1971,1999), the continuous human rights abuses in Indian occupied Kashmir and the escalation of militarisation in (Indian and Pakistan administered) Kashmir. There have been several structural and political obstacles to the process set out by the observer group. In this section, the paper will reflect on two specific aspects: firstly, the evolution of the relationship of India and Pakistan with the UN military observer group till 2014. Secondly, the paper will also look at missed opportunities and evaluate ineffectiveness of the organisation in peacebuilding.
In the last section, a reflection on the effectivity of UN-peacebuilding, its relationship with different grassroots organisations, government organisations and the potential for re-imaging future engagement with the ongoing militarised conflict will be assessed. Here, the focus will be on the role of grassroots activists and organisations such as JKCSS and APDP will be elaborated on. Simultaneously, the paper hopes to elaborate on what alternative support and legitimation can be provided to the movements of self-determination in the case of Kashmir.
