Description
Liberal and constructivist theories in IR and peacebuilding literature had high hopes for UN peacebuilding. The diffusion of (liberal or universal) norms, peace through international and regional cooperation, the protection of civilians and human security are still key elements of this thinking, with the addition of strong local ownership, resilience etc. What is left of these hopes? The practice of UN (military) peacebuilding, for example in the Sahel Zone, offers very different outcomes: Rising violence between peacebuilders and violent groups, against civilians, unstable governments and political orders, and a lack of international legitimacy. Furthermore, the UN is clearly only one of several external agents present – and regional organizations plus bilateral operations have not help to decrease, but instead led to an increase of violence. Currently, peacebuilding in the region appears much more as robust counterinsurgency and has effectively turned into a machinery of “violence diffusion”, instead of working towards peace. However, this is not a one way street and must not necessarily determine the future of peacebuilding. In the paper, I will present hints and traces of how UN peacebuilding could “demilitarize” and offer again pathways to the transformation of violence and to peace in the context of the Sahel Zone.
