Description
While Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept has emerged as an initiative of global appeal, Japanese postwar foreign policy was long criticised for its lack of ambition and long-term vision. In the early postwar years, this reactive diplomatic posture was known as rinji gaikō (臨時外交) – ‘provisional, ad hoc diplomacy’ – and perceived as an unwelcome side-effect of the Yoshida Doctrine. This paper offers a historical perspective on some erstwhile attempts at overcoming rinji gaikō, drawing on diplomatic sources, diaries, and printed media from the 1960s-80s period. It examines how, in particular, the use of special envoys (semi-informal diplomatic agents appointed by the premier) was believed to be a viable solution to ad hoc diplomacy, leveraging personal rather than institutional networks and bypassing bureaucratic structures. I argue that, ironically, such attempts at personalisation and presidentialisation of Japanese foreign policy further contributed to, rather than countered, Japan’s ‘provisional’ diplomatic engagement.
