Description
My research aims to investigate whether – and if yes, to what extent - the long discussions between Turkey and the European Union (EU) on Turkey’s accession to the EU have had any consequences – intended and or unintended – in the authoritarianisation of the country.
Turkey became an official candidate to accede to the European Union in 1999. Official negotiations started in 2005. After more than 20 years, Turkey has not accessed the EU, and the country looks like an almost dead case of the EU enlargement policy (Lippert 2021). Furthermore, after an initial period in which Turkey enjoyed some democratic reforms, the country has turned into an authoritarian regime (Yilmaz et al. 2019; Arısan 2019; Özbudun 2015; Tolstrup 2015; Adas, 2006).
To some extent, the authoritarianisation of Turkey might appear a ‘violation of expectations’ (Curini & Franzese, 2020). This is because talks for acceding the European Union should impact constructing a well-functioning market economy and a solid and democratic state through the politics of conditionality. The EU cannot legally force candidate countries into good governance, but they should help governments’ behaviour through incentives and persuasion (Van Hüllen, 2012). Furthermore, existing literature shows that the requirements asked by the Union to gain membership have been historically positive (Vachudova 2006).
All these reasons induced me to believe that looking at the intended and or unintended consequences of EU negotiations on the Turkish political regime might provide an innovative contribution, considering that the international dimension of Turkish authoritarianisation has received little attention (Kutlay 2020, Baykan 2018, Somer 2016).
