Description
The recent invasion of Russia into Ukraine is perhaps the most significant moment with regard to the European security order since the end of the Cold War. Semantics of this crisis aside, the popular perceptions as to the causality of it continue to revolve around the act of aggression perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine. However, what is not generally being taken into account is the historical context which lies beneath such alignment of actions and circumstances that have led to the precipitation of the Ukrainian crisis into a full-scale military conflict. This paper attempts to holistically examine the actions of NATO and various other international actors during the three bygone decades, in and around what were considered to be the satellite states of the erstwhile Soviet Union, in order to delineate the rationale behind Russia’s actions in Ukraine in the backdrop of what she presented as a threat to her national security. By employing qualitative content analysis, it argues that the step-by-step eastward expansion of NATO after, and even during the unipolar world order, gradually created a heightened sense of insecurities within the Russian establishment, with the prospect of Ukraine joining in acting as a breaking point in European geopolitics. Ultimately, the paper postulates that the invasion of Ukraine also marks a “maxima” moment for the United States and the NATO, as it is going to alter the security order of the continent, wherein the paradigm of collective securitisation shall move away from expansion of defence capabilities, and towards the bolstering of existent defences in place.
