Description
The failure of the 2022 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference to achieve an outcome agreement has again highlighted the long-standing frustrations and stagnation at the heart of multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations. In this paper I ask whether, and to what extent, minilateralism, with negotiations conducted between a ‘magic number’ of ‘key’ states, holds the answer to progress for the NPT. Drawing on the extant scholarship surrounding mini-multilateralism, alongside historic and recent empirical developments in group politics within the NPT, the paper first distinguishes two types of minilateralism: procedural (focusing on the ‘Friends of the Chair’ practice) and political (focusing on the US-led CEND initiative), detailing their respective (de)merits for the legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the NPT as a multilateral forum. I argue that while the ‘Friends of Chair’ practice is now an important embedded process of NPT review conferences, CEND constitutes something of a new high stakes game, offering prospects for achieving genuine progress for the NPT, yet at the possible expense of the multilateral process itself. The paper concludes with suggestions for best utilising procedural and political minilateralism as States Parties now look to establish a working group on strengthening the NPT review process.
