Description
Why do some treaties face difficult entry-into-force prospects after negotiators agree on their legal provisions? Bilateral nuclear arms control treaties usually require simple exchanges of diplomatic notes to enter into force. Their multilateral counterparts often face more contentious journeys. These treaties usually indicate the number of states that must deposit ratification instruments, or may even require participation by specific states. This paper presents a theory of treaty entry-into-force. I argue that negotiators may identify key named veto players to ensure successful implementation. In both arms control and other areas of international cooperation, the more veto players an agreement mandates, the greater its potential effectiveness. Yet, unintended consequences may emerge as an expanded club of veto players increases entry-into force challenges. Put differently: There is a trade-off between treaty effectiveness and ease of entry-into-force. I demonstrate the logic of the argument with a case study of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Language requiring ratification by 44 named “nuclear-capable” states has created significant obstacles to realizing an inspectable global prohibition on nuclear explosive testing.
