Description
Despite the establishment of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm, enacted in the U.N. by unanimity in 2005, it still faces many challenges regarding protecting against major humanitarian crimes. As an example, though R2P was intended to be a framework for the international duty to protect, it does not provide standardized solutions for every crisis, partly because assessments of facts and circumstances are often unclear. Nowhere is this more evident than the use-of-force provision under R2P’s third pillar. This under-researched area is of major importance in discussions about the enabling capabilities, cooperation between intelligence units, burden-sharing mechanisms, military operations, and resources that make third pillar (militarized) interventions possible. By simultaneously drawing on the experiences of Libya and Syria during 2011 and generating insights into the Russia-Ukraine War, this paper makes three arguments. First, the interaction between values, interests, and politics, on both national and international levels, determines whether and how states choose to militarily intervene (or not) to protect civilians from atrocities. Second, the strategic challenges of R2P implementation in Libya and Syria are significant factors in shaping the current discussions of intervention in Ukraine. Third, when analyzed together, the three cases call into question the viability of the United Nations in the implementation and enforcement of strategies specified by R2P’s third pillar.
