Description
This paper analyses why the United States did not use nuclear weapons during the Cold War using the principal-agent framework of civil-military relations. Since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, despite facing severe strategic and tactical tribulations during subsequent wars, the US refrained from using nuclear weapons. Existing explanations include nuclear deterrence and taboo theories, however these do not provide consistent explanations for the non-use of nuclear weapons. Instead, the indispensable factor that must be considered in decision-making for the non-use of nuclear weapons is civilian control. This paper demonstrates how US presidents controlled the attempts of US commanders to use tactical nuclear weapons. It theoretically explores how civilian supremacy over the military influenced nuclear weapons decision-making. An analysis of strategic interaction between political leadership and the military through the principal-agent framework provides a clearer explanation for the US non-use of nuclear weapons. This paper employs a historical case study using declassified documents to illustrate the theoretical lens through the cases of the Korean and Vietnam wars.
