Description
Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence; NATO; Extended Nuclear Deterrence; Security Strategy; Nuclear Strategy
The US’ extended nuclear deterrence (END) is widely perceived as an effective strategy for the defense of NATO members. This necessitates the assumption of END as efficient in deterring military challengers. However, this perception is largely based on assumptions derived from the material aspects of nuclear weapons, like their destructive power and the lack of feasible defense against them. This paper critically reviews and analyzes scholarly literature on the logic and theoretical assumptions concerning END and aims to identify contradictions and obstacles to it. Therefore, this paper asks whether the material aspects of END provide sufficient reason for supporting its assumed effectiveness as a deterrent threat. Shedding a light on obstacles and contradictions of this strategy is necessary to understand potential risks of NATO`s reliance on END. Preliminary findings indicate that these problems range from normative obstacles against the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons, to the question of whether END has any decisive effect on the behavior of potential challengers. If the findings show the insufficiency of the logical foundation of END to assume its effectiveness, further research should approach the question how END became and remains the central defense strategy of NATO without a resolution of the identified problems.
