Description
Foreign states can support warring parties in civil wars by sharing material and expertise (“indirect support”) or by to dispatching military forces to partake in combat (“direct support”). In many conflicts, states initially provide indirect support, and later expand their involvement to direct support. When does this transition take place? This paper argues that sponsors will provide direct support in the wake of a negative conflict outcome, represented by defeats of the proxy, when (1) battlefield action needs to be taken quickly before the costs of proxy war increase, and (2) the proxy appears unwilling or unable to obtain meaningful battlefield success. Faced with the prospects of a sharp increase in the costs of proxy war, and with no time to transfer skills to the proxy via training and advising, the sponsor will be incentivized to intervene directly before a window closes. The paper applies the logic of support escalation to case of the Spanish Civil War, process tracing the origin of Fascist Italy’s increasing involvement in the conflict between July and December of 1936. It shows that dictator Benito Mussolini first opted for indirect assistance to rebel general Francisco Franco. As the latter failed to quickly end the war, however, the former decided to send a significant troop contingent before the costs of assistance became too high. By explaining the shift from a logic of indirect assistance to one of direct support, this article significantly improves our understanding of the of use of military force in foreign civil wars.
