Description
Why do statebuilding efforts fail, even when supported by powerful international coalitions? The rapid collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan shocked many contemporary observers and exposed severe weaknesses in the international community's ambitious twenty-year statebuilding programme. This paper focuses on two questions: 1) What accounts for the rapid collapse of the Islamic Republic and the lack of resilience in Afghanistan's state institutions? 2) What are the implications for mainstream assumptions about statebuilding theory and practice in chronically-insecure states? Drawing from an elite bargains framework and several interviews with senior officials, we argue that, while the Republic had significant structural weaknesses that threatened the regime's long term survival, the rapid collapse of the country was accelerated by several contingent factors related to elite decision-making from international and Afghan elites. More optimal outcomes were possible had different decisions been taken in the lead-up to the collapse. We reflect on implications for statebuilding and intervention going forward.
Keywords: Afghanistan, Peace Process, Statebuilding, Intervention, Taliban, Insurgency
