Description
There is a pervasive assumption underpinning research and analysis of solar geoengineering – a suite of technological approaches that aim to reflect a fraction of incoming sunlight - that states considering developing such capabilities would base their decisions solely on questions related to climate risks. But what other explanatory models might account for (non)proliferation of solar geoengineering capabilities? We revisit Scott Sagan’s (1995) three models for why states might develop nuclear weapons technology in which he argued that security against external threats was by no means the only possible - nor even necessarily the best – explanation. Domestic interest group coalitions and normative expectations regarding the role and identity of states in international relations were explored as two additional models of explanation. We adapt the explanatory models with reference to the distinctive world-views and expectations of our diverse informants on solar geoengineering considering issues such as: diverse potential interests in developing and acquiring high-leverage technologies, differing understandings of climate security, the and the impacts of norms around climate action. In conclusion we warn against ‘climate determinist’ framings that potentially obscure political and in particular security dynamics, and we suggest widening the lens to consider governance designs to regulate solar geoengineering proliferation outside a rationalist climate policy frame.
