Description
Recent literature advocates 1) adopting a Coxian or ‘neo-Gramscian’ approach to reforming the global nuclear order and 2) taking seriously the methodological need to think about the role of imagined futures and ‘timescapes’ in nuclear ordering. This paper proceeds in two parts. First, I argue that counter-hegemonic nuclear politics must move beyond both historically directed critique and discourse-focused approaches to reform. They should be oriented towards possible future developments which could prise open space for counter-hegemonic nuclear ordering initiatives—recalling that ‘prefigurative politics’ is an important element of counter-hegemony.
Second, I draw on recent work which posits ‘future counterfactual’ scenarios in the context of nuclear strategy. I apply this logic two scenarios—which may not be probable but are thinkable and plausible enough that they must be taken seriously—which might offer opportunities to mount different forms of counter-hegemonic nuclear politics. These are 1) Welsh independence from the United Kingdom and the possible impact of independent Welsh nuclear disarmament diplomacy, and 2) temporary or permanent U.S. loss of centralized control over part or all of its strategic nuclear arsenal. The aim is not to predict outcomes but to prefiguratively demonstrate the possibility of mounting counter-hegemonic political responses in such scenarios.
