Description
The rise of institutional complexity, whereby policy issues are governed by a growing number of diverse and overlapping actors, is typically portrayed as a recent phenomenon only. However, even largely hierarchical complexes have often witnessed enduring contestation of their focal and long-standing international organizations. The paper focuses on the postwar trade complex, initially centered around the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By drawing on new theoretical insights and primary sources, it displays how institutional complexity has been a defining feature of this complex, and how GATT’s leadership has been progressively challenged by major new actors. The paper offers two main contributions. First, it shows how the GATT reacted to external institutional threats by modulating its responses on the characteristics of the challenge faced. Second, it sheds a light on the many actors which contributed to govern global trade in the postwar years, including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). By showing how these actors responded to distinct weaknesses of the GATT, the paper highlights their role in furthering a collective legitimation of the postwar trade complex and filling existing governance gaps.
