Description
Hierarchical inter-state relations are pervasive in which a dominant state possesses setting certain rules and constraints for a subordinate counterpart. These are sovereignty restrictions that embody the terms of hierarchy but also easily become sites of political struggles when subordinate states seek greater autonomy. Under what conditions can a subordinate state successfully lift sovereignty restrictions? Which means it adopts is most effective? Based on a reconceptualization of hierarchy, this paper proposes a relational theory reorienting academic attention from structural and domestic factors to dyadic interactions. It contends that variations in lifting sovereignty restrictions critically hinges on two factors: commitment (a)symmetry and coercive costs. Commitment (a)symmetry measures whether there is a disparity between a sheltering state’s commitment to lift a sovereignty restriction and its shelter state’s commitment to preserving that restriction whereas coercive costs are the price that a dominant state perceives it will bear if it takes coercive measures to bring a subordinate state in line with it over the renegotiation of the terms of hierarchy. A subordinate state might use commitment-shifting mechanisms such as reassurance, compensation, and fragmentation to change its dominant state’s will to change the weaker side’s policy stance forcefully. Meanwhile, it may take advantage of cost-amplifying mechanisms such as association, fortification, and diversification to amplify the effect of the constraining factors that limit its patron’s freedom of action. The paper will apply the theory to explain the variations in outcomes in Nepal’s efforts to contest existing security arrangements with India in the 1960s and late 1980s.
