Description
How does the risk of entrapment affect the foreign policy of the weaker ally in an asymmetric alliance during crisis situations? Alignment theories and foreign policy analyses largely argue that the fear of abandonment guides weaker states’ alliance policies even at the risk of greater entrapment. Moreover, such cost-benefit analysis, as argued in the literature, reflects the military imbalance between the two allies. However, fears of entrapment and abandonment are not perfectly inversely related. While the weaker side of the alliance usually supports the stronger ally’s foreign policy decisions, we argue that the former will also withhold support or even contradict the latter’s established course of action in crisis situations should the aggressive actions put the weaker side’s survival at risk. By examining the weaker ally’s foreign policies under such a condition, we highlight that the support of the weaker side is not always unconditional, and variations exist. To test our argument, we conduct a within-case analysis and show when and how South Korea has sometimes deviated from the US’s preferred policy during the various US-North Korea nuclear crises in the post-Cold War era. We conclude with broad theoretical and policy implications.
