Description
Deterrence by state powers in the present days involves a wider portfolio of instruments, yet many of these “new” forms still remain underreported, and their influence generally underappreciated in international politics. Such dynamics point to an aspect which is often neglected: what are the motives and drivers behind the choice of these instruments? Why do some states choose certain instruments, while others not? This paper challenges the common wisdom that the choice of the instruments of deterrence relies on effectiveness-seeking and the achievement of punishment and/or denial strategies. While the logic of consequentiality is undeniably a key aspect in the decision-making of the coercer, elements such as ideology and identity also play a relevant role in the choice of deterrent instruments. Against this backdrop, the paper proposes an analytical framework which pulls together the interest in power politics and foreign policy, and intersubjectivity, in order to analyze the connections among and the interplay between the material and the ideational, social construction and rationality, and identities and interests in the choice of deterrence instruments. To strengthen this analytical framework, the paper draws examples from two countries: Russia and Turkey.
