Description
The article examines the role that nuclear weapons play in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It analyses Russia's implicit and direct nuclear threats to deter the West from military intervention, withdraw its support and force Ukraine to surrender. Based on statements made by officials from the beginning of the war until the summer of 2023, I study how the Russian leadership has approached nuclear risk management. Contrary to the common assumption of unrestrained public nuclear threats, I show that Russian officials alternate between affirming nuclear capabilities and dismissing the idea of nuclear use as illogical and unnecessary. This finding points to the complexity of political communication in and between modern media societies, which must consider different speaker positions and target audiences, but it also illustrates the paradoxes of deterrence policy. While the creation of uncertainty in the public sphere has become a strategic resource, it can also undermine the credibility of nuclear threats directed at political and military decision-makers. An analysis of strategic nuclear communication must therefore distinguish between media noise and genuine signals.
