Description
This paper examines the role of knowledge and non-knowledge in global nuclear governance, particularly in nuclear verification. The authors argue that knowledge cannot be seen as pure factual truth emerging directly from data but as the aggregated outcome of both technical data and interpretations. Such interpretations are often unquestioned if the overall verification regime is functioning well. However, the thus produced knowledge in nuclear verification is of high strategic value: it is subject to political negotiation processes and is potentially contested. Since the produced knowledge forms the basis for decision-making processes associated with confidence-building, its quality, and the production process must be of interest beyond the technical level and must be considered systemically: knowledge is produced in far more complex systems, so-called knowledge infrastructures. These infrastructures are a part of epistemic regimes consisting of norms, rules, agreements, institutions, and practices that regulate and organise the production, distribution, and use of knowledge by defining collection and processing standards. By using the IAEA as a case study, our contribution aims to shed light on the challenges of knowledge production and decision-making. In doing so, we contribute to an interpretive understanding of nuclear governance that recognises the importance of knowledge, discourse, and power.
