Description
This paper examines the shifting dynamics of negotiated state-building in a conflict setting, using Afghanistan as a case study. Applying Mushtaq Khan’s political settlement framework which is focused on the organisation and distribution of power and resources (rent distribution) and the organisational arrangement to sustain this, this paper compares the changing dynamics of political settlements between Karzai (2001-2014) and Ghani administrations (2014-2021) exploring how shifts in the nature of political settlement between the state and powerful elites led to contrasting outcomes to the state-building efforts to the two administrations. Karzai forged a political settlement with powerful elites at the centre and periphery by co-opting them into the government and distributing them rents to buy their loyalty. This policy sustained some degree of order and stability, though it was fragile. In contrast, Ghani disrupted the existing political settlement forged by Karzai halting rent distributions to powerful elites. Ghani’s approach yielded few gains in terms of the government’s capacity and legitimacy; however, it proved destabilising amidst an escalating war. This policy weakened key peripheral powerholders, who could have fought against the Taliban. Ghani’s disruption policy, along with the US peace talks with the Taliban, expedited the collapse of the state.
