Description
Liberal reforms implemented in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict, especially Security Sector Reform (SSR), aim to strengthen civilian control over the military, but they are not always successful. This paper argues that, paradoxically, illiberal or ‘a-liberal’ strategies can be more effective, drawing from the case of Côte d’Ivoire. After the conclusion of an internal conflict in 2011, Côte d’Ivoire struggled with the integration of the former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN – New Forces) in the security forces. The fragmentation of the security sector and the power of the former comzones (zone commanders) of the FN were seen by many observers as a threat to civilian leaders. Fears were further heightened by major military mutinies in 2017. However, as of 2023, the civilian regime appears to have successfully consolidated its control over the security forces. This paper argues that, rather than formal SSR, this control has been achieved through informal strategies such as strategic appointments, co-optation and purging. Building on the literature on civil-military relations in authoritarian regimes and coup proofing, I ask whether illiberal peacebuilding can in the long term have unexpected liberal consequences, such as reducing the power of the military to unsettle civilian rulers.
