Description
China’s establishment of Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and its subsequent forays into infrastructure developments across multiple regions have resulted in augmentation of its international status. These multi-pronged activities have prompted the US to adequately respond. Existing scholarship has attempted to explain the US reactive behaviour through focusing on dynamics of conceptual broadening of its strategy through development of Indo-Pacific community, among other general answers to the rise of China, and explanation of factors leading to discourse hardening vis-à-vis China within the US. Recently, in cooperation with G7, the US has launched Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, an initiative that appears to be directed as a counter-measure to BRI. The aim of this paper is to empirically assess how and to what extent the US and its principal Asia-Pacific allies have practically engaged in collaborative counteracting measures in regions that were outside of the US direct purview before the advent of BRI- Central Asia and Pacific Island countries. The paper specifically aims to study the modalities of how allies can steer the principal’s practical engagements in the context of great power competition. The paper aspires to contribute to debates within studies of social aspects of great power rivalry and studies on influence of junior partners within the US alliances.
