Description
After the Vietnam War, the United States attempted to reduce its troops, which led to the deterioration of the South Korea-US alliance. However, interest in the withdrawal attempt by the Carter administration, which was ultimately unsuccessful, has been limited. This paper explores Why US civil-military preferences clashed, and how that led to the failure of President Carter's all-out withdrawal of US ground forces from Korea. Previous studies suggesting that US foreign policy patterns and strategic interests determined the withdrawal of US forces stationed abroad have not provided a coherent account of the domestic determinants of the withdrawal failure, particularly the intervention by military elites. An alternative, yet essential factor to consider is civil-military relations. Even in mature democracies like the United States, foreign and national security policy preferences can differ significantly between civilian leaders and military elites. In such cases, military elites have resisted the president's foreign policy leadership through various political tactics and alliances with Congress. This paper uses a dual principal-agent model and causal process tracing to trace the trajectory of strategic interactions between the president, Congress, and military elites. In doing so, this paper demonstrates how US military elites can undermine presidential supremacy over US foreign policymaking.
