Description
Why and how do states establish non-nuclear or deterrence-based orders? This paper addresses this question by delving into the dynamics influencing state decisions to accept or reject nuclear deterrence, with a focus on the Global South. We explore how a trust mindset can ground stable non-nuclear weapons security orders, in contrast with a distrust mindset prevailing in deterrence-based security orders. The concept of trust is understood as a “leap of faith” in an environment “where betrayal is always a possibility.” This “leap of faith” is both cognitive-driven and context-dependent. To assess both features, we developed a three-level analytical framework, examining contextual, cognitive, and operative elements of security orders. To apply our model, we analyse developments in Latin America and South Asia from the 1960s to the early 2000s, highlighting their distinct paths in rejecting and adopting nuclear deterrence. Methodologically, we combine historical analysis, process tracing, document research, and interviews. In the concluding section, we offer a comparative analysis of both regions and suggest avenues for future research.
