Description
In spite of criticizing sanctions imposed by the US, India has adapted to several US sanction regimes aimed to check nuclear proliferation by states. As sanctions became an important part of Washington’s policy tool-kit after India’s first nuclear test in 1974, New Delhi maintained that it will not, and has never supported unilateral sanctions against any state. Despite India’s professed aversion to sanctions, India has lent latent support to several US nonproliferation sanction regimes. India might have maintained a dismissive attitude towards sanctions in general and its rhetoric has remained consistently unsympathetic, however when imposed to check proliferation of nuclear weapons, India has been rather complaisant. The accommodation has however been circuitous, wherein New Delhi has attempted to maintain a balance between its aversion to sanctions as a policy instrument, while lending support to nonproliferation. This article looks into how India’s stand on sanctions became more accommodative and adaptive of the sanction regime initiated by Western states when intended for nuclear nonproliferation. It argues, India has established a golden mean, wherein it adapts to particular aspects of sanctions regime, although expects accommodation from the senders as well
