Description
Why do some rebel groups’ alliances last longer than others? The increasing number of multiparty civil wars showed a growing number of rebel groups’ alliances spanning from simple military cooperation to institutionalised coalitions. While existing scholarship on rebel groups’ alliances focuses on why and with whom insurgent organisations form coalitions, why rebel alliances last longer than others is still understudied. I argue that alliances that develop power-sharing agreements and institutions last longer than simple military forms of cooperation. In this respect, the former are related to political goals, while the latter to instrumental goals. Moreover, contrary to interstate alliances, rebel groups have fewer constraints in defecting from the alliances. Against this backdrop, external shocks might push coalition members to defect from their alliances. In this respect, I argue that inclusive and balanced power-sharing agreements can resist external shocks. To test the argument, I use the most similar system design, comparing the case of the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces in the Syrian conflict.
