Description
It has been argued that Hugo Grotius offers ‘the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention—the principle that the exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops where outrage upon humanity begins’. What has not been explored, though, is the place of friendship in Grotius’s theory of humanitarian intervention. Friendship was once a preeminent political concept and is foundational to Aristotle’s polis, and is a recurrent theme in Cicero, Aquinas, and even Bodin. In the Rights of War and Peace Grotius states that ‘[a] third Reason for War is the Protection of our Friends [amicorum], whom tho’ not under any formal Promise, yet upon the Score of Friendship we are under an Obligation of assisting, provided we bring not ourselves into any great Trouble, and Inconveniences by it’. Therefore, this paper will explore the connection between Grotian humanitarian intervention and friendship whilst also probing its relation to his distinction between perfect and imperfect duties.
