Description
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on small states in the domain of conflict mediation. We use the case study of Qatari mediation in the Horn of Africa to address three questions: 1) In what ways does the intrinsic neutrality of small states bolster their credibility in mediation? 2) To what extent are the mediation norms that typically apply to large state mediators relevant in mediation led by small states? And 3) what role does economic statecraft play in the outcome of mediation? This paper builds on existing studies (Goetschel, 2011 & 2020; Hellmüller et al., 2020; Pring & Federer, 2020) to argue that small states, like Qatar, devoid of geopolitical ‘baggage’ and lacking the typical ‘size’ to be threatening, offer a unique vantage point in mediation processes, but also that this is insufficient to ensure successful mediation. Instead, the effective use of economic statecraft is also necessary. We find that in Qatari mediation, perceptions of its neutrality and the absence of behaviour that can be interpreted as threatening are central to its acceptance as a mediator but that its success is due to its use of economic statecraft. Furthermore, while norms influence Qatar’s mediating role (see: Mason et al., 2011), its ‘legitimacy’ is not tied to common normative policy positions and the risk of ‘losing face’ is minimised should Qatari mediation not reflect the well-publicised normative policies of larger states. This has clear implications for accepting small states as mediators in future conflicts.
