Description
Why do some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and coercions but by initiating conciliatory gestures? Some rationalist IR theorists assume that there is always a permanent state of fear under anarchy, which impedes sending conciliatory gestures. Other scholars open up spaces for trust as a precondition for peace/cooperation rather than the unavoidable tragedy. However, the former president of South Korea and Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Kim Dae-jung, said “We try all our best to keep peace on the Korean peninsula. It is not because we trust them, but because we hope for peace.” Even though trust and hope need to be distinguished in terms of a precondition for cooperation/peace, existing studies have marginalized hope and it has been paid biased attention at best in terms of an obstacle to impede sensible decision-making. Therefore, this paper investigates (i) how hope becomes possible and (ii) how hope shapes conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships by examining two different South Korean conciliatory gestures toward North Korea: Sunshine Policy and Trustpolitik.
