Description
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, Indian strategic thinkers began to argue that India had lessons for the world based on the so-called “Indian experience” in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. That the Indian state is experienced in such battles is on some level undeniable. The Indian state has been continuously engaged with fighting insurgencies since gaining independence in 1947. Yet, the nature- and potential value of the (supposedly) exceptional “experience” gained therein has been quite a bit less than obvious to many – both within and beyond India. In other words, experience has not always translated into a credible claim to global expertise or authority on counterinsurgency. Quite the contrary. Through an analysis of archival sources on Indian counterinsurgency thinking, this paper traces the longer history of efforts to develop a body of specifically Indian counterinsurgency knowledge and to position it to others, elsewhere. While taking seriously that counterinsurgency is a global project that has never and can never be contained within national borders, I argue that the case of India shows a desire to enter into this global politics on different terms than simply being the recipient of others’ expertise and the presumed location at the global margins.
