Description
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 there has been a marked increase in interest in Russian actions in Chechnya during the Chechen Wars. With some of their nascent plans for post-conflict security provision and many of their actions in occupied territories sharing parallels with previous actions in Chechnya. This paper will focus on the Russian use of local forces as an approach to providing security in Chechnya and how did this enable them to pacify a region with a long history of resistance?
The use of local indigenous elements has become a standard part of Counterinsurgency doctrine across the world, with Western efforts to train and equip such a force failing most recently in Afghanistan, despite the seemingly ‘Just’ nature of their cause. How is it that, at least superficially, it appears the Russian approach in Chechnya succeeded despite the brutal and unjust actions undertaken by the forces under their command?
This paper will focus on the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 and the Russian use of indigenous elements to establish a new government and security apparatus whilst exploring the parallels to their more recent actions in Ukraine.
