Description
Existing literature on the status politics of power transitions tends to overwhelmingly focus on the relationship between status denial and conflict. Far less attention is paid to the conditions under which status politics can lead to international cooperation. We argue that the prospect of earning status or of not losing earned status is a strong motivator for rising powers to uphold existing international institutions, rules, and norms. Rising powers seek a seat at the global high table and are keen to avoid being seen as the principal spoiler of international cooperation when the international order is sufficiently amenable to their status aspirations. As a result, they will often begrudgingly support existing arrangements for the sake of maintaining or augmenting their social position in the order’s social hierarchy. This approach entails rhetorically challenging an institution while publicly supporting the implementation of its rules and norms. We illustrate this dynamic in the historical case of Japan and naval arms control in the interwar period, and two recent cases of China and nuclear proliferation in the 1990s and India and the responsibility to protect in the 2000s.
