Description
This contribution leverages Spinoza’s philosophy to conceptualize national and international circulations of affects. Specifically, Spinoza offers theoretical foundations for defining collective affects and understanding the mechanisms responsible for their dissemination.
The challenge in defining collective affects stems from two ontological assumptions: dualism, which posits a separation between ideas and matter, rationality and emotions; and individualism, asserting that emotions, being bodily, are inherently individual. In contrast, the Spinozian perspective, which has already informed affect studies via Deleuze, embraces a monist ontology (rejecting the rationality/emotions dichotomy) and a transindividual view (rejecting the notion of individual bodies).
While establishing ontological foundations is crucial for defining affects, it is not sufficient for comprehending their collective nature. Existing perspectives within the subfield of emotions in International Relations often either link collective emotions solely to pre-existing communities, thereby neglecting certain phenomena, or emphasize the flexibility and creativity of affects, risking an insufficient understanding of the psychological mechanisms at play. Spinoza's theory of affects offers a middle ground by identifying affective mechanisms that hinge not on identity but on identification— which is an act of imagination. By doing so, a Spinozian approach to affects provides us with a structure of affective circulations.
