Description
From the beginning of 21st century, “stabilisation” has been one of the buzzwords much heard in security policy. The term is often associated with problems of fragile states, such as civil wars, political instability and social unrest, but its definition and implication remained unclear. What is “stabilization” after all? What “stabilisation” has brought in security policymaking and its implications? To scrutinize these questions, this paper focuses on the case of Afghanistan during the last two decades. The reasons are two-fold. First, the concept of “stabilisation” mostly evolved in Afghanistan in the context of War on Terror since 2001 with a close relation to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and statebuilding. Second, the pursuit of “stabilization” has reached a turning point in 2021 with the fall of Afghan government and the resurgence of Taliban regime. By tracing the rise and fall of “stabilization” in Afghanistan, therefore, we can expect to find a clue to understand the essence of “stabilization.” For this purpose, my paper will examine changing discourses appeared in stabilization-related policies papers, especially issued by the United States and Britain. Hypothetically, the paper will conclude that policymakers kept the term “stabilization” undefined (probably)on purpose to maximize leeway for counterterrorism operations.
