Description
The paper argues that in order to understand why Russia was able to use energy as a weapon against the European states that aided Ukraine, whilst it was also - to a degree - able to withstand the impact of the sanctions and to finance the war in Ukraine, we have to analyze the responses of key actors in the wake of the 1973 and 2003 energy crises. In other words, we must look at the crucial structural shifts which occurred, and that Russia used to its advantage in more recent times. The 1973 crises triggered a reorientation of Western European consumers away from Middle Eastern energy resources towards Soviet and, later on, Russian gas and oil, effectively creating real vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit. The post-2003 period, which was characterized by a whole series of shocks that began manifesting themselves during the time of the invasion of Iraq, brought about the advent of the shale revolution but also led to a backlash by the Russians and the Saudis and resulted in the formation of OPEC+ (i.e., a greater control over the oil prices). Those two elements, a) leverage gained against critical Western gas consumers and b) the alliance of convenience with another major oil producer, created a situation in which Russia could use energy as a weapon- to a limited degree - whilst managing the adverse effect of sanctions.
