Description
The article engages with the subject of Russia’s policy in Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, approaching it from realistic perspective. It is based on field data collection in Syria in 2018 – 2020 by the author. Research explores Russia’s original rationale for involvement in Syria and how it changed under the influence of external circumstances and developments on the ground. It discusses the range of tools employed, including deployment of the state and non-state security actors, application of diplomatic, economic and soft-power means, and the extent to which Russia relied on the human capital built in Syria in the previous era. The paper examines, how Russia’s policy related to the recipient government and its protagonists in Syria, and how it defined itself vis-à-vis other international actors. It also sheds light on the significance of Syria for Russia’s domestic security and the way Russian security actors addressed this challenge. The paper argues that the key concepts and tools applied in Syria, considered by Moscow as successful, formed pillars of its foreign operations in other unstable parts of the world.
